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Entrepreneurship has been traditionally concentrated in the hands of a few small communities in
most developing economies. As these economies restructure, it is evident that these communities will
be unable to satisfy the increased demand for new entrepreneurs. The analysis in this paper suggests
that new business networks will compensate for the weak family background of first-generation entrepreneurs
under some circumstances, supporting occupational mobility even in industries with significant barriers
to entry. Using new firm-level data on the Indian diamond industry, the empirical analysis documents
the important role played by an underlying community network in the expansion from agriculture










Entrepreneurship – the successful establishment and management of new business – plays a critical
role in the development process. Following Banerjee and Newman’s (1993) seminal contribution, the
dominant view among development economists today is that ineﬃcient credit markets can create
substantial barriers to entry among potential entrepreneurs, with negative consequences for both
growth and distribution. Although empirical tests of this hypothesis have provided mixed results
(McKenzie and Woodruﬀ 2002, Paulson, Townsend and Karaivanov 2006), it has nevertheless had a
major impact on development policy, with numerous eﬀorts initiated worldwide to provide micro-credit
to ﬂedgling entrepreneurs.
Most micro-credit initiatives focus on small business, such as managing a shop or engaging in
petty trade, and the two studies listed above, for example, report a median investment of less than
one thousand dollars among the enterprizes that they sample. This paper is concerned, in contrast,
with business activity at a larger scale that employs much greater amounts of both capital and labor.
Within this class of potential entrepreneurs, a lack of business connections and commercial knowhow
rather than liquidity might be the most signiﬁcant barrier to entry (Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000,
make the same claim for the transition to self-employment in the United States). Business success in
a developing economy requires a knowledge of the system; how to take advantage of legal loopholes and
who to bribe. It also requires connections to buyers, sellers, bank loan oﬃcers, and other government
oﬃcials. In such an economy, an individual who is born into a business family has a distinct advantage.
The wealth that he inherits makes it easier to secure bank credit, while the experience and training that
he receives from his father teaches him how to make connections and, more generally, how to exploit the
opportunities that are available in the system. An entrepreneur who is born into a business community
has an additional advantage, net of his family background, with community-based networks providing
credit, insurance, and business connections to their members throughout the world (Fafchamps 2001,
Rauch and Trinidade 2002).
It is consequently not surprising that entrepreneurship has been historically concentrated in the
hands of a few communities in most developing economies. As these economies restructure and make
the transition to a potentially steeper growth path, however, it is evident that these small communities
will be unable to satisfy the increased demand for new entrepreneurs. The Indian economy, for
example, has been growing rapidly since the early 1990s. A critical question for India’s long-term
1growth prospects and its ability to emerge as a global economic power is whether and how it will be
able to draw from a wider pool of entrepreneurial talent in the future.1
Weber’s (1958) pessimistic prognosis for India’s economic future was not based on credit market
imperfections, but on the rigid caste-based nature of Indian society, which he believed was inherently
hostile to occupational mobility and, by extension, to business and entrepreneurship. This explained
why Indian business was historically dominated by a single caste-group, the Vaishyas, and by non-
Hindu communities such as Jains and Parsis. Modern historians such as Chandravarkar (1985) and
Rudner (1994) have argued, in contrast, that occupational mobility has occurred on occassion, even in
this caste-based society where connections are so important, when new entrepreneurial opportunities
became available. In their view, mobility was historically facilitated through the endogenous formation
of new networks in groups without a prior business background. This paper provides empirical support
for this hypothesis by documenting the role played by a new community-based business network in
supporting the expansion from agriculture to international business in one community – the Kanbi
Patels – in one important Indian industry – the diamond industry – over the course of a single
generation.2
India does not produce rough diamonds. The rough diamonds must ﬁrst be imported, typically
from Antwerp, and then cut and polished in factories and workshops, most of which are located in the
city of Surat, north of Bombay. The polished diamonds are subsequently sold on the Bombay market
to foreign buyers or shipped directly abroad. A combination of commercial acumen and cheap labor
facilitated the rapid expansion of the diamond industry, which accounts for roughly 14% of India’s
total merchandize exports, and has competed with textiles, and more recently with computer software,
as the country’s top export industry over the course of the past three decades. It is estimated that
approximately one thousand Indian diamond export ﬁrms employ over a million workers and that this
industry accounts for as much as 85% of the rough diamonds cut and polished worldwide (60% by
1Recently it has been suggested that there are “too many” entrepreneurs in India (Banerjee and Duﬂo 2007). However,
it is unlikely that the petty entrepreneurs that Banerjee and Duﬂo observe will have the skills and the capacity to a run
a business at the scale that is considered in this paper. Similarly, Karlan and Valdivia (2006) show in a very interesting
recent experiment that small amounts of entrepreneurship training have a signiﬁcant impact on the business performance
of self-employed individuals enrolled in a Peruvian micro-ﬁnance program. Once again, such interventions are unlikely
to be suﬃcient to train potential entrepreneurs to run businesses that employ large numbers of workers and require high
levels of commercial acumen.
2Although networks may serve a useful purpose when markets function imperfectly, these collective arrangements can
give rise to dynamic ineﬃciencies that constrain the individual’s response to new opportunities (Greif 1994, Kranton
1996, Rauch 2001). Recent evidence from urban India indicates that traditional caste-based networks can indeed restrict
mobility (Munshi and Rosenzweig 2006). The analysis in this paper suggests, in contrast, that new networks might at
the same time be forming to facilitate mobility in growing economies.
2value) today (GJEPC 1998, Purani 2000).
Although much has been made of India’s software industry and the growth of its economy more
generally over the past decade, the diamond industry has also grown rapidly, at an average rate of 10%
per year since the mid-1970s, for the most part outside the public eye. Diamond ﬁrms are notoriously
secretive, partly due to the high value and hence the security concerns associated with their prod-
uct. Diamonds, particularly rough diamonds, are also diﬃcult to value objectively and can be easily
swapped, and so diamond transactions rarely involve written contracts. Trust plays an important role
in this industry, which is not surprisingly associated with a high degree of community networking, and
with it low transparency, world-wide. Ultra-orthodox Jews historically controlled the Antwerp market
and continue to control the New York market (Richman 2006), and in India two traditional business
communities – Gujarati Jains from the town of Palanpur (known in the industry as Palanpuris) and
Marwaris originally from the state of Rajasthan – have dominated the industry from its inception
in the mid-1960s. The commitment problems that arise naturally with diamond transactions would
suggest that there are enormous barriers to entry for outsiders in this industry. Nevertheless, the
Indian diamond industry has undergone a dramatic change in its sociological composition – with the
entry of a new community into the business – which we will attempt to understand in this paper.
Historically, the Palanpuris and Marwaris handled the business end of the industry, leaving the
cutting and the polishing to Kanbi Patels (known in the industry as Kathiawaris). The Kathiawaris
are farmers from Saurashtra in the interior of Gujarat, many of whom migrated to Surat to work as
laborers in the diamond industry when it started to grow in the mid-1960s. Some of these migrants
became manufacturing contractors, in charge of entire workshops or factories, and these contractors in
turn brought more members of their caste to work in the Surat industry. Commitment problems arise
at the manufacturing stage as well, with swapping of roughs being a common complaint, and so most
Marwari and Palanpuri businessmen built long-term relationships with their Kathiawari contractors.
In the late 1970s, a supply shock hit the industry with the opening of Australia’s Argyle mines. This
weakened DeBeer’s monopoly power in the industry, with a commensurate increase in the supply of
rough diamonds on the market. The story told by knowledgeable Indian diamond exporters is that
the existing Marwari and Palanpuri networks were unable to grow fast enough to absorb the increased
supply of rough diamonds, prompting some businessmen to open the door to the diamond trade to their
trusted Kathiawari contractors. Bank credit has, until recently, been unavailable to diamond ﬁrms
for good reason, due to the particular nature of this business. Thus, the critical step in the diamond
3trading process is accessing rough diamonds on credit from abroad. Palanpuri businessmen, who had
established branches in Antwerp by that time, provided excess roughs to their contractors or served as
guarantors for other suppliers. The early Kathiawari entrants took advantage of this opportunity to
bring other members of their community into the business, providing connections to rough suppliers in
Antwerp and other forms of support, and the number of Kathiawari ﬁrms subsequently grew rapidly
over time.
The analysis in this paper is based for the most part on a survey of nearly 800 diamond export ﬁrms,
with oﬃces in the Bombay market, that I conducted in 2004-05. The survey collected information on
the senior partner’s personal and family background, the ﬁrm’s history, and its business relationships.
Based on this information, the business background of entrants into the industry can be plotted
across communities and over time. Not surprisingly, the Kathiawaris are less likely to report that
their father was a businessman than their more established rivals. Closer inspection of the data
reveals, in addition, a substantial widening in this community-gap over time. Most of the Marwari and
Palanpuri entrepreneurs are the sons of businessmen, irrespective of when their ﬁrm was established.
In contrast, while most of the early Kathiawari entrants also had family backgrounds in business,
there is a substantial decline in inherited business experience across entering cohorts. Around 10% of
the Kathiwari entrepreneurs who established their businesses in the late 1970s report that their father
was a farmer, but this statistic increases steadily over time and by 1990 over 60% of the Kathiawari
entrants were the sons of farmers.
How do entrepreneurs with such diﬀerent backgrounds co-exist in this industry and how can we
explain the divergence across communities over time? The explanation put forward in this paper is
that while business networks may be active in all three communities, the Kathiawari network strength-
ened most rapidly once it had crystallized, compensating for the increasingly weak background of its
entering members. Although the Palanpuris and particularly the Marwaris have many business oppor-
tunities outside the diamond industry, the next best option for a Kathiawari entrepreneur is farming
or managing a diamond workshop in Surat, neither of which is particularly remunerative. We would
thus expect the Kathiawaris to have invested most heavily in their industry-speciﬁc network once it
was established. Analysis of ﬁrm performance across communities and over time provides independent
support for the compensatory role of the Kathiawari network, while inspection of intra-industry mar-
riage patterns suggests a mechanism through which the Kathiawari network grew so strong. Previous
analysis of networks by economists has treated these institutions independently of the markets that
4they supplement (Kranton 1996 is a notable exception). The theoretical framework developed in this
paper generates predictions for changes in the organization of ﬁrms, across communities and over
time, as the underlying networks develop, which we will successfully verify, providing an additional
dimension along which networks shape economic activity in this industry.
This paper documents the role played by a new business network in supporting occupational mobil-
ity in an industry with substantial barriers to entry. Although no external interventions were necessary
in the diamond industry, the concluding section of the paper considers the role that policy instruments
could play in promoting entrepreneurship in other circumstances. I will argue that although standard
solutions, such as the infusion of bank credit, can sometimes be very eﬀective, recent developments in
the diamond industry demonstrate that they can have unexpected negative consequences in industries
where networks and markets co-exist.
2 The Institutional Setting
2.1 Entrepreneurship in India
“The history of the rise and growth of a modern business class in India is largely the history of the
activities of members of certain groups” (Gadgil 1959: 16). One broad caste group, the Vaishyas,
traditionally controlled money-lending and trade in India, with sub-castes or jatis drawn from this
group active in diﬀerent regions of the country. Mercantile opportunities expanded considerably with
the arrival of the British in the eighteenth century and, not surprisingly, these opportunities were
captured by the traditional business jatis and by a few non-Hindu communities such as the Jains and
the Parsis.
Commercial activity under the British was concentrated around the ports of Calcutta and Bombay.
Parsis and Gujarati Banias dominated Bombay’s textile manufacturing, ﬁnance, and foreign trade from
the middle of the nineteenth century (Nafziger 1971). Commercial activity in Calcutta was already
controlled by Marwari traders and bankers, originally from Rajasthan, by this time. Although the
Marwaris made the transition to industry relatively late – around 1914 – they subsequently rapidly
expanded their industrial and trading activities throughout the country (Lamb 1955).
The Marwaris, Parsis, and Gujarati trading jatis continue to dominate modern industry and bank-
ing, especially in major cities such as Bombay and Calcutta. For example, Timberg (1978) reports
that 23 of the 37 largest North Indian owned industrial houses listed in the Monopolies Inquiry Com-
5mission Report of 1964 were Marwaris and Gujaratis. Timberg also cites a Time Magazine article
(March 1, 1963, p. 77) in which it is estimated that the Marwaris controlled 60% of the assets in
Indian industry at that time. More recently, a Times of India article (October 20, 2006) estimates
that Gujarati promoted companies account for 17% of the market capitalization of the BSE-500 index,
followed by Marwari promoted companies with 11% and Parsi promoted companies with 8%. Public
sector units, including banks and oil companies, account for 25% and all other companies, including
multinationals, just 39% of the market capitalization.3 A recent survey of garment export ﬁrms in
South India, reported in Banerjee and Munshi (2004), suggests that these traditional communities
play an important role in industries characterized by a smaller scale of production and in regions
where they have historically been less active as well.
The fact that traditional business communities continue to dominate mercantile activity in India
does not imply that outsiders will not step forward in the future. There are some notable examples
of non-mercantile communities making the transition to business when new opportunities became
available, such as the entry of the Parsis into trade and industry under the British (Medhora 1965)
and more recently the expansion of the Gounder community in Tamil Nadu from agriculture to textile
manufacturing and exports in Tirupur (Cawthorne 1995). We know very little about the preconditions
or the process through which such occupational mobility occurs and so it seems especially relevant to
study the expansion from agriculture to business among the Kathiawaris.
2.2 A Brief History of the Indian Diamond Industry
The history of the modern Indian diamond industry begins in the 1880s when two diamond mer-
chants from the town of Palanpur in Northern Gujarat, Surajmal Lallubhai and Amulakh Khubhchand
Parikh, expanded their business to Bombay, Calcutta, and Rangoon.4 Over the next two decades,
many Palanpuri Jains followed these pioneers into the diamond business, and later the pearl trade,
and the Palanpuri network reached as far as Antwerp, where 20-25 families were settled by 1937. The
overseas Palanpuris were forced to return to India during World War II and the industry suﬀered a
further blow after independence in 1947 when the import of rough diamonds was banned to preserve
scarce foreign exchange. The diamond business was restricted to domestic trade in polished stones,
3The market capitalization of the BSE-500 index is 92% of the total BSE (Bombay Stock Exchange) market capital-
ization.
4The discussion on the Palanpuris in this section is based on Chhotalal (1990) and an unpublished interview with the
(former) Nawab of Palanpur conducted by Mark Boston and Sharada Dwivedi. The discussion on the Kathiawaris that
follows is drawn from Engelshoven (2002).
6for the most part, until the mid-1960s, when the Multi-Rate Import Replenishment Scheme allowed
rough diamonds to be imported once again, against the export of rough diamonds.
Workshops were quickly set up in Surat, Navsari, and other inland centers to cut and polish
diamonds and the industry grew extremely rapidly thereafter. Marwari businessmen also entered
the diamond industry at this time. The Marwari network is more diversiﬁed, both spatially and
by business activity, than any other community network in the country. Some of the new Marwari
entrants had experience in the colored-stone business, which was traditionally centered around the city
of Jaipur in Rajasthan, but other merchants were attracted by the high rate of return on investment
in the diamond industry.
In these early years, the Palanpuris and Marwaris handled the trading end of the diamond business,
while Kathiawaris cut and polished the diamonds. The Kathiawaris are a caste of cultivators who
worked historically as sharecroppers and laborers in Saurashtra, an arid region in Gujarat that is
prone to drought and famine. The ﬁrst Kathiawari migrants came to Surat in the 1960s, just as
the diamond industry was starting to grow. Initially the Kathiawaris worked in factories owned by
Palanpuris and local Surtis. However, many of the early migrants were able to set up their own
workshops and factories by the early 1970s, doing contract work for Palanpuri and Marwari exporters.
As discussed earlier, some of these contractors were encouraged to enter the import-export business in
the late-1970s by Palanpuris with whom they had established close personal ties, and we will see that
the Kathiawari network grew at least as fast as the Palanpuri and Marwari networks in the decades
that followed.5 What is most remarkable about this rapid growth is that the Kathiawari network had
to draw from a pool of potential entrepreneurs with little family experience in business to expand,
whereas the Palanpuris and the Marwaris belong to communities with many generations of business
experience.
5Exporters maintain long-term relationships with their manufacturing contractors to avoid commitment problems
at the cutting and polishing stage of the production process. This allows a high level of trust to be sustained across
community lines between the exporters and their contractors. The fact that the early Kathiawari entrants were supported
by Palanpuris is not disputed in the diamond industry, although individual ﬁrms are reluctant to admit that they were
assisted in this way. Statements such as the following are often heard: “‘Kathiawadis are here because of the Palanpuris’
admits a Kathiawadi diamond merchant. The Palanpuris, who were the market leaders brought the Kathiawadis into
the trade. Help came not only in the form of ﬁnance but as initiation into the import-export sector.” Diamond World
(November-December 1999: p.52-53).
72.3 The Survey
Although aggregate diamond statistics are available over many years, detailed ﬁrm-level information
could only be obtained by conducting a survey of the industry. Diamond ﬁrms are very secretive and
so every eﬀort was made to establish connections within the industry before the survey commenced.
Assisted by a few close personal connections within the industry, I gradually built up a small network
of inﬂuential diamond exporters over a two-year period, which in turn later helped the survey team
penetrate each of the community networks. Despite this strong support, it was a challenge to gain
access to the ﬁrms, and the implementation of the survey itself provides useful insights into the
workings of this industry.
The population of ﬁrms is based on a computerized database maintained by the Gem and Jewelry
Export Promotion Council (GJEPC) of all its members. This database includes the name of the ﬁrm,
its address and telephone numbers, the name of a contact individual (typically the senior partner), and
the ﬁrm’s export ﬁgures, each year from 1995 onwards. Under the Multi-Rate Import Replenishment
Scheme, a ﬁrm’s foreign exchange quota, which allowed it to (legally) import roughs, was based on
its previous exports. The GJEPC veriﬁed the export ﬁgures for its members and then forwarded
them to the Government of India. Most exporters availed of this useful service, and so the GJEPC
database provides us with a comprehensive list of ﬁrms that exported polished diamonds, each year,
over the past decade. I was able to gain access to this database, covering the 1995-2003 period, at the
beginning of 2004.
For security reasons, diamond markets tend to be spatially concentrated world-wide. In Bombay,
the polished diamond market covers approximately 0.25 square miles in the Opera House area of the
city. Hundreds of the larger ﬁrms have oﬃces in two buildings – Panchratna and Prasad Chambers
– and the smaller ﬁrms are crowded into buildings in the adjacent lanes and by-lanes. Somewhat
surprisingly, however, a preliminary inspection of the GJEPC database revealed a signiﬁcant fraction of
ﬁrms with addresses outside the Opera House area. Diamond ﬁrms often operate under multiple names
to exploit income tax loopholes and many of these “shell” ﬁrms are listed in residential areas where the
diamond merchants live. In an economy where foreign exchange was until recently tightly regulated,
the import-export nature of the diamond business also attracted ﬁrms, known in the industry as
choprawallas (book-keepers), that were engaged in money laundering rather than legitimate diamond
business. Many of these ﬁrms would also be listed outside the Opera House area. My industry contacts
8assured me that ﬁrms with legitimate activity in the diamond industry would have at least one oﬃce
in the Opera House area and so the relevant population of ﬁrms for the survey was restricted to the
1,854 ﬁrms with addresses in that area, listed in the GJEPC database as exporting in any year over
the 2001-03 period.
To test its ability to gain access to these ﬁrms, the survey team sent letters of introduction from
the chairman of the GJEPC and the principal investigator to 40 ﬁrms drawn randomly from the list of
1,854 ﬁrms operating in the Opera House area. These ﬁrms were subsequently contacted by telephone
to arrange an appointment, but only three agreed to be interviewed. It was clear from the outset that
the only way to achieve a reasonable response rate in such a heavily networked industry was to use
our own social connections. A computerized referral system was set up, and each ﬁrm in my personal
network provided a list of ﬁrms that it was tied closely with. These ﬁrms, in turn, provided additional
referrals, and the process continued until all the names on our list had been covered. Progress was
slow to begin with, and only 63 interviews were completed in December 2004, the ﬁrst month of
the survey. However, the pace increased thereafter, to six interviews per day, and the survey was
ultimately completed in ﬁve months.
Of the 1,854 ﬁrms on our list, we were able to ascertain that 480 were multiple-name listings, 288
were choprawallas, 102 could not be contacted by phone, 53 had shut down, and 9 had no partners in
town during the survey period, leaving us with 922 eligible ﬁrms. We ultimately interviewed 777 ﬁrms,
giving us an overall response rate of 84.3%.6 Among the ﬁrms that we interviewed, 96.3% belonged to
the three major communities and of these ﬁrms, 29% were Kathiawari, 17% were Marwari, and 54%
were Palanpuri. When providing referrals, our contacts were simply asked to list ﬁrms that they were
closely tied with, without any prompting from our side. It is worth noting that not a single referral
led us to a ﬁrm without at least one oﬃce in the Opera House area, justifying the spatial restriction
placed on the population of relevant ﬁrms. Moreover, only 5.7% of the sampled ﬁrms did not appear
in the GJEPC database, supporting the assumption that this database eﬀectively covers the entire
population of active exporters.7
6The ﬁrms that could not be contacted using the phone number provided by the GJEPC or traced through the
directory enquiry system had either changed their name or shut down. Firms without a partner in town over a ﬁve
month period are also unlikely to be active in the export market. The response rate across communities was 85.7% for
the Kathiawaris, 89.3% for the Marwaris, and 81.9% for the Palanpuris.
7Towards the end of the survey, respondents were provided with a list of ﬁrms from our list that were still to be
contacted. The survey team also made 36 appointments in the ﬁnal month of the survey by telephoning exporters
directly. While these few deviations from the usual procedure would naturally reduce the number of referrals made
outside the list, they are unlikely to undermine the basic claim that the GJEPC database eﬀectively covers all active
9The sampled ﬁrms are all currently active. Much of the analysis in this paper is concerned with
changes in the industry and so we would, in principle, need information on exit as well. Fortunately,
exit rates in the diamond industry are extremely low, consistent with the theoretical framework in
Section 4, which predicts that ﬁrms should not exit once they enter this industry. The GJEPC
database lists all exporters, each year, over the 1995-2003 period. I assume that a ﬁrm exits in a given
year if it was exporting in that year but fails to show up thereafter. It seems reasonable to assume that
a ﬁrm which fails to show up continuously for three years or longer has permanently exited, allowing
me to compute exit rates each year from 1995 to 2000. Restricting attention to ﬁrms in the Opera
House area, exit rates are low each year – just around 1.5% – and there is no discernable time trend
in these statistics. Moreover, exit rates do not vary by community.8
The computerized system that we had set up to schedule interviews included data ﬁelds to record
the identity of up to ﬁve individuals who had provided referrals for each ﬁrm. We would speak on
behalf of these individuals when arranging interviews with the ﬁrms; in many cases this was suﬃcient
for the ﬁrm to agree to be interviewed, but in other cases the ﬁrms did contact the individual who had
provided the referral to verify its authenticity. Although it is well known that community networks
play an important role in this industry, the survey respondents were generally reluctant to report the
support that they received from members of their community or from other close connections in the
diamond industry. The pattern of referrals that was received evidently had research value since it
could be used to provide direct evidence on the importance of community ties and so the survey team
was instructed to continue to ﬁll those data ﬁelds even after a ﬁrm had been interviewed.
Table 1 lists the major sources of referrals, the number of referrals that they provided, and the
community-wise breakdown of ﬁrms that received these referrals. We started with the largest ﬁrms in
the industry and gradually moved down the ﬁrm-size distribution as we received referrals to smaller
and smaller ﬁrms. Because of this non-random sequence of interviews and because the number of
referrals is restricted to ﬁve per ﬁrm, we clearly do not have a representative sample of referrals. The
statistics in Table 1 should be treated with caution, but the cross-community referral patterns reported
exporters and that it is appropriate to restrict attention to ﬁrms located in the Opera House area.
8The contact names included in the GJEPC database, together with a detailed knowledge of ﬁrms in the industry,
allowed my contacts and their employees to assign a community aﬃliation to each ﬁrm in the database that was located in
the Opera House area. Names are a good indicator of community aﬃliation, and comparing this assignment to the actual
aﬃliation, obtained from the survey, just 6.3% of the sampled ﬁrms were miscoded. Based on the assigned community
aﬃliation, annual exit rates over the 1995-2000 period are 1.8% for the Kathiawaris, 1.1% for the Marwaris, and 1.5%
for the Palanpuris.
10below are nevertheless indicative of the important role that social ties play in this industry. A total of
295 individuals provided referrals; 72% were exporters belonging to the three main communities, 16%
were brokers, and the remaining 12% were exporters from other communities and individuals outside
the industry who had social connections with particular exporters. A total of 1,473 referrals were
provided by these sources; 76% from the exporters, 16% from the brokers, and 8% from other sources.
Although the three communities are represented roughly in proportion to their share in the population
of export ﬁrms in Column 1, Marwaris are over-represented, while Kathiawaris are under-represented
in terms of their share of the total referrals provided in Column 2.
Looking across Columns 3-5 it is apparent that exporters from each community disproportionately
provide referrals to members of their own group. Given that Kathiawaris make up just 29% of all
ﬁrms, it is quite striking that 74% of the referrals from Kathiawari exporters are to members of their
community. This pattern of within-community referrals matches well with the rapidly strengthening
network ties that we later document for this community. Marwaris and Palanpuris also favor members
of their own community, but not as conspicuously as the Kathiawaris. The Marwaris in particular
make a substantial number of cross-community referrals. We will see that the Marwaris concentrate
on the polished side of the market where community aﬃliation is less important, which explains why
the Marwari exporters appear to maintain connections across all communities. In contrast with the
pattern of referrals made by the exporters, the distribution of referrals made by brokers – who belong
to diﬀerent communities and must interact with ﬁrms of all communities – generally matches the
composition of ﬁrms, by community, in the industry.
3 The Diamond Industry Today
3.1 Organization of Production
Most diamond exporters visit Antwerp once every month or every other month for a few days to
acquire rough diamonds, have these diamonds cut and polished in workshops located in Surat, and
then sell the polished diamonds on the Bombay market or directly to foreign buyers. “Much of
the diamond industry revolves around the issue of getting a regular supply of good quality [rough]
diamonds” (Engelshoven 1999: 371). Rough suppliers in Antwerp and the largest exporters receive
parcels directly from the Diamond Trading Corporation (DTC), the trading arm of DeBeers, or from
other primary suppliers of rough diamonds. These parcels will typically comprise stones of various
11grades and sizes. Individual exporters, however, will tend to specialize in stones of a particular size,
which implies that they must approach diﬀerent suppliers in Antwerp from one trip to the next.9 The
rough stones are received on credit without a written contract. Without the ability to establish a
long-term relationship with a single supplier, the commitment problems that could consequently arise
are substantial.
I argue that this is where the community network comes in: Firms that have established close ties
with particular suppliers provide referrals for other members of their community. The set of ﬁrms
providing referrals varies from one period to the next depending on the mix of stones received by the
suppliers in Antwerp. Firms providing referrals have supplier-speciﬁc reputations, and presumably
the rents that go with them, at stake and so they will ensure that ﬁrms receiving the rough stones do
not renege on their obligations. Firms will typically draw upon diﬀerent members of their community
to provide referrals from one trip to the next, and so a multilateral punishment strategy of the sort
described by Greif (1993), in which no ﬁrm provides referrals to an entrepreneur who has deviated in
the past in equilibrium, must presumably be in place to maintain cooperative behavior.10
Table 2, Panel A describes transactions on the rough side of the market. Firms have 10-12 sup-
pliers per year and 70% of the ﬁrms have a dominant supplier who provides more than 30% of their
roughs. Diﬀerent ﬁrms will have diﬀerent dominant suppliers, allowing for cross-referrals across ﬁrms
as described above. Much of the rough supply (around 70%) comes from Antwerp. The other major
alternative source of roughs is the Bombay secondary market, where the price is substantially higher
but the commitment problems less severe since the ﬁrms have a permanent presence in the city. No-
tice that the Kathiawaris receive a signiﬁcantly greater fraction of their roughs from Antwerp than
9Diamonds are classiﬁed by size and shape. In the questionnaire we deﬁned eight categories – seven sizes and a
separate category for “fancy shapes” – and asked the entrepreneurs to report the proportion of their output (by value) in
each category. Despite this ﬁne classiﬁcation of stones, a substantial fraction of the ﬁrm’s output is devoted to a single
– most popular – category: 52% for the Kathiawaris, 42% for the Marwaris, and 48% for the Palanpuris. The Marwaris
are signiﬁcantly less specialized, in large part because their business is centered on the polished side of the market, where
ﬂexibility is less costly.
10Suppose that a limited number of exporters are in a position to provide a ﬁxed number of referrals in each period.
If one of those exporters deviates from the equilibrium and provides a referral to someone who has reneged on his
obligations in the past, the previous cheater’s only incentive to be honest is to maintain ties with his benefactor. In
contrast, someone who has been honest in the past has an additional incentive to be honest; to receive referrals from
other exporters in the future. As long as there is some probability that the deviating exporter will be unable to provide
a referral in the next period, irrespective of current-period behavior, previously honest individuals will have a strictly
greater incentive to honor their commitments and so will be preferred, ruling out such deviations from the cooperative
equilibrium. The Antwerp suppliers could, in principle, have organized a similar arrangement to punish exporters who
reneged on their obligations. However, they would have less information and enforcement power than a coalition of
exporters drawn from the same community for this purpose.
12the other two communities, consistent with the view that they have access to a stronger network.11
Despite the high value of the rough diamonds and the potential for default, much of the rough supply
is obtained on credit and rarely involves a written contract, across all three communities, emphasizing
the important role played by the networks.
In contrast with rough diamond transactions, where referrals are critical and ﬁrms tend to do
business with a limited number of suppliers, the polished side of the industry operates very much like
a spot-market. Firms have as many as 30-50 buyers per year in Panel B, which describes transactions
on the polished side of the market, and relatively few (around 60%) of the ﬁrms have a single dominant
buyer, despite the fact that a dominant buyer is now deﬁned to account for just 20% of the ﬁrm’s
product. A substantial fraction of the polished diamonds are also sold on the Bombay market, typically
through brokers, either to merchant exporters or visiting foreign buyers. Notice that the Marwaris
perform particularly well on the polished side of the market; they have more buyers per year, yet
are more likely to report a dominant buyer (indicative of a balanced client portfolio) and to sell
their polished directly abroad. This observation is consistent with the subsequent analysis, which
indicates that the Marwari rough-diamond network is relatively weak and that diamond ﬁrms from
this community tend to concentrate on the polished side of the market.
Polished diamonds are largely sold on credit and these transactions rarely involve a written con-
tract, so commitment problems could potentially arise on this side of the market as well, with buyers
reneging on their obligations. Although referrals play an important role on the rough side of the
market, ﬁrms do not share polished buyers with each other according to my industry informants.
Because ﬁrms tend to specialize in particular stone sizes, they can build long-term relationships with
a few foreign buyers instead, channelling the rest of their output abroad through numerous merchant
exporters. Merchant exporters restrict their activity to buying polished diamonds on the Bombay
market and selling these diamonds to established foreign clients. All export ﬁrms, including the mer-
chant exporters, have a permanent presence in Bombay and so commitment problems between local
ﬁrms naturally tend to be less severe on the polished side of the market. Along the same lines, we
do not expect community networks to play an active role at the cutting and polishing stage of the
production process either. Entrepreneurs can always establish long-term bilateral relationships with
their manufacturing contractors to avoid the commitment problems, associated with the swapping of
11The very largest ﬁrms, known as sightholders, receive roughs directly from the DTC. A relatively small number of
ﬁrms also buy roughs from Israel. Allowing for all of these possibilities, the Kathiawaris continue to receive a greater
share of their roughs from outside the Bombay market than the other communities.
13roughs, that arise at this stage. Consistent with this view, the respondents in the survey reported an
average relationship of 16 years with their manufacturing contractors.
Information on the ﬁrm’s transactions was also collected when it ﬁrst started exporting. Although
not reported, the patterns in Table 2 are by and large the same when the transactions statistics are
computed at this earlier point in time. The number of suppliers and buyers is smaller, less than half of
what we see in Table 2, but most other aspects of these transactions do not change with the ﬁrm’s age
or over time. The only exceptions are the proportion of roughs bought directly from Antwerp, which
has declined for the Marwaris and Palanpuris relative to the Kathiawaris, and the repayment period
on the polished side of the market, which was about 90 days when the ﬁrms ﬁrst started exporting
and has now increased to about 110 days. These two observations are consistent with a strengthening
of the Kathiawari rough-network and a decline in proﬁt margins with the entry of new ﬁrms over
time. Many Marwari and Palanpuri ﬁrms have chosen to exit the rough side of the business in recent
years, restricting their activity to merchant exporting. These ﬁrms are not included when computing
the rough statistics in Table 2, Panel A and these changes in the organization of the ﬁrm, across
communities, will also show up in subsequent sections where we theoretically and empirically explore
changes in the industry over time.
3.2 Characteristics of Entrepreneurs
The history of the industry described earlier would suggest that exporters from the three communities
should come from very diﬀerent backgrounds. The descriptive statistics in Table 3, based on data
collected from the senior partner in each ﬁrm, indicate that this is indeed the case.
The entrepreneur’s age is (mechanically) negatively correlated with the year that the ﬁrm was
established. Not surprisingly, the Kathiawari respondents are younger than the Marwari respondents,
who in turn are younger than the Palanpuri respondents in our sample. The Kathiawaris also have
signiﬁcantly lower educational attainment, measured by years of schooling, than the entrepreneurs
from the more established business communities. One important schooling decision that parents must
make in India is whether to send the children to secondary school in English or the local language
(university education is almost always in English, at least in the major metropolitan areas). Munshi
and Rosenzweig (2006) describe how this choice has important implications for the children’s future; in
the diamond industry, ﬂuency in English and the westernization that goes with English schooling allow
entrepreneurs to make contact and establish personal relationships more easily with foreign buyers
14and suppliers. The Kathiawaris are less likely to have been schooled in English than the Marwaris
and Palanpuris, and they are further disadvantaged by being less likely to have grown up in Bombay
(as compared with the Palanpuris). This lack of urban experience is potentially a liability when it
comes to establishing branches abroad and interacting with foreign buyers and suppliers. Notice that a
relatively low proportion of Marwaris also report having grown up in Bombay, but this simply reﬂects
the wide scope of their business activities; although not reported, many of them grew up in urban
centers elsewhere in the country and this will become apparent in a moment when we describe the
occupations of their fathers.
Table 3, Panel B describes the entrepreneur’s father’s occupation, which is aggregated into seven
categories: farming, white-collar professional, other business, other jewelry business, diamond cutting
and polishing, diamond broker or trader, and diamond exporting. The most striking observation from
these statistics is that 53% of the Kathiawaris, but just over 2% of the Marwaris and Palanpuris, report
that their fathers were farmers. Looking down the other occupational categories, the Kathiawaris are
signiﬁcantly less likely to belong to a business family than the other two communities: 35% of the
Kathiawaris versus 82% of the Marwaris and 76% of the Palanpuris report that their father was
engaged in any type of business.
Table 4 subjects the community diﬀerences uncovered in Table 3 to greater scrutiny by studying












i measures the family background or the education of entrepreneur i belonging to commu-
nity j, EY
j
i is the year in which his ﬁrm was established, δj is a vector of community dummies, and 
j
i
is a mean-zero disturbance term. Treating the Palanpuris as the reference category, the coeﬃcient on
the Kathiawari-establishment year interaction term will be negative (positive) if the gap between the
Kathiawaris and the more established communities in Table 3 is widening (narrowing) across entering
cohorts.
The dependent variable takes the value one if the entrepreneur’s father was not a farmer, zero if
he was in Table 4, Column 1. Non-business activities are expanded to include white-collar profes-
sional occupations and diamond cutting and polishing in Column 2. Finally, we measure ω
j
i by the
entrepreneur’s years of schooling in Column 3. The coeﬃcient on the establishment year variable is
15negative in all three columns but only signiﬁcant in Column 3. More importantly, the coeﬃcient on
the interaction of this variable with the Kathiawari dummy is negative and signiﬁcant (except with
schooling as the dependent variable). The Marwari-establishment year coeﬃcient, in contrast, is small
in magnitude and imprecisely estimated.12
The explanation put forward in this paper for the widening gap between the Kathiawaris and the
more established communities is that a rapidly strengthening Kathiawari network was able to support
increasingly weak entrants from that community at the margin. An alternative explanation is based
on changing characteristics in the population that the entrepreneurs are drawn from. Suppose that
entrepreneurs are selected randomly from this population. The pattern of coeﬃcients in Columns 1-3
could also be obtained if father’s occupation and the entrepreneur’s educational attainment diverge
across communities over time. To disentangle diﬀerential selection into the industry due to changes in
the underlying networks from exogenous variation in population characteristics, we take advantage of
the fact that entrepreneurs establish their ﬁrms at diﬀerent ages. The father’s occupation is inherited
at birth (or relatively early in life if there were career changes in the previous generation). The en-
trepreneur’s own educational attainment is strongly correlated with his father’s occupation and, more
generally, these population characteristics will vary across age cohorts in each community. The speci-
ﬁcations in Columns 4-6 consequently include the entrepreneur’s age and age-community interaction
terms as additional regressors. Conditional on the age variables, the establishment year eﬀect can then
be attributed to diﬀerential selection into the industry in response to contemporaneous changes in the
underlying community networks. The Kathiawari-establishment year coeﬃcient becomes even more
negative once the age terms are included and is now signiﬁcant even with schooling as the dependent
variable.13
To demonstrate the economic importance of the community diﬀerences reported in Table 4,
I present nonparametric estimates of the relationship between business background, measured by
whether the entrepreneur’s father was a farmer, and the ﬁrm’s establishment year (net age eﬀects) in
12For ﬁrms that were formed following a separation by partners, the establishment year is measured by the year of
separation. The results in Table 4 are unaﬀected when the establishment year is measured instead by the year in which
the original ﬁrm was established or the year in which the ﬁrm started exporting.
13Although the age coeﬃcients are not reported in Table 4, it is worth mentioning that the coeﬃcient on the Kathiawari-
age interaction term is negative and signiﬁcant in all columns. This indicates that schooling levels and business back-
grounds in the population are converging across these communities, which is not surprising since the Kathiawaris started
at such a low level. Some of the entrepreneurs in the oldest ﬁrms inherited the business from their fathers and it follows
that the age-establishment year correlation will be naturally weaker in such ﬁrms. Dropping those ﬁrms has no eﬀect on
the establishment year coeﬃcients.
16Figure 1.14 Almost all entrants, regardless of their community, came from non-farming backgrounds
in 1970. While this pattern remains constant over time for the Marwaris and the Palanpuris, starting
from the late 1970s the Kathiawari entrants are increasingly likely to have fathers who were farmers
and by 1990 over 60% of the Kathiawari entrants have farming backgrounds. With the less inclusive
business classiﬁcation corresponding to Table 4, Column 5, 90% of the Marwaris and 80% of the
Palanpuris that started their ﬁrms in 1975 had fathers in business. This statistic drops to 70% for
both communities by 1990. However, this decline is dwarfed by the corresponding decline for the
entering Kathiawaris; from 70% in 1975 to 30% in 1990.15
4 Networks and Entrepreneurship
This section presents a simple model of the diamond industry that clariﬁes the role played by com-
munity networks in supporting entrants with weaker business backgrounds at the margin over time.
The model generates simple tests, based on ﬁrm performance across communities and over time, that
allow us to rule out alternative non-network explanations for the entry patterns observed in Figure 1
and Table 4.
4.1 A Simple Model of the Diamond Industry
4.1.1 Production and Network Technology
Each ﬁrm in this industry consists of a single entrepreneur who buys rough diamonds from Antwerp
on credit at the beginning of each period, has the rough diamonds cut and polished in Surat, and
then sells the polished diamonds on the competitive Bombay market. His proﬁts at the end of the
period are determined by his sales net of the loan that he must repay to the rough supplier. The
unit price of rough and polished diamonds is constant over time. Diamond cutting and polishing is
a labor intensive activity that does not require great skill. Firms in the industry employ the same
production technology, with a single worker assigned to a single machine, and so must increase their
14The nonparametric kernel estimates are constructed in two steps: Estimate the regression corresponding to Table 4,
Column 4, separately by community, with EY -squared as an additional regressor. This allows for additional ﬂexibility in
the relationship between father’s occupation and the ﬁrm’s establishment year. Compute mean age by community and
subtract this from each entrepreneur’s age. Subtract this diﬀerenced variable, multiplied by the estimated age coeﬃcient
from the regression just described, from the dependent variable. This generates a measure of father’s occupation net age
eﬀects. Then nonparametrically regress this measure on the ﬁrm’s establishment year, separately by community, using
the Epanechnikov kernel function.
15Schooling levels match these trends in occupational background: The Marwari entrepreneurs maintain roughly 14
years of schooling, and the Palanpuris roughly 13 years of schooling, over the 1975-1990 period. The Kathiawaris start
with 13 years of schooling in 1975 and fall below 11 years by 1990.
17production by hiring new workers. With constant returns to scale in production, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt is
a linear function of the amount of rough diamonds that it can procure, which varies across ﬁrms and
over time.
Each entrepreneur is characterized by an ability endowment that reﬂects his family background.
More able entrepreneurs are better positioned to independently establish connections with suppliers
in Antwerp and so the amount of roughs procured is increasing in ability. The entrepreneur will also
receive referrals from members of his network to rough suppliers. A stronger network provides more
referrals or can support a higher level of credit per referral in the cooperative equilibrium, increasing
the amount of roughs made available to its members.
4.1.2 Selection into the Industry
Payoﬀs inside the diamond industry are increasing in the entrepreneur’s ability and the strength of his
network, as described above. The inﬁnitely lived individual must choose whether or not to enter the
industry at a ﬁxed age. He will receive referrals from the cohort of entrants that preceded him and so







t−1 measures the strength of the network that he inherits, ω
j
i is the
individual’s ability, and rI measures the returns to ability inside the industry. We will see in a moment
that these payoﬀs remain constant over the individual’s lifetime in equilibrium. The assumption that
the individual receives referrals from the cohort that preceded him is clearly quite special. However,
it rules out strategic entry behavior and simpliﬁes the network dynamics derived in the next section,
while retaining the main intuition for our results.
Individuals belong to two communities, the H-community and the L-community, which are distin-
guished only by the quality of the options available to their members outside the diamond industry.
In practice, the L-community refers to the Kathiawaris while the H-community includes the more
established Marwaris and Palanpuris. The payoﬀ outside the diamond industry for individual i from
community j in any period is described by the expression uj+rOω
j
i, where uj measures outside options
that are common across all members of the community, uL < uH, and rO measures the returns to
individual ability outside the industry. The diamond industry is an industry in which an individual
with initiative and resourcefulness can do exceptionally well and so it seems reasonable to assume that
rI > rO.
Without individual experience eﬀects, the individual will enter the industry in period t as long as
18his payoﬀs inside the industry exceed the payoﬀs outside in that period. In general, there exists a
threshold ability ω
j








Suppose that ability is uniformally distributed on the unit interval for all cohorts in both com-
munities. This assumption will later allow us to conveniently evaluate the eﬀect of changes in the
underlying ability distribution on the pattern of entry and the strength of the networks. It then fol-
lows that individuals with ωi ∈ [ω
j
t,1] will enter the industry and entrepreneurs with ωi ∈ [0,ω
j
t) will
stay outside. Individuals receive referrals from their network in perpetuity, so it is easy to verify that
a strategy in which no ﬁrm exits once it has entered the industry can be sustained in equilibrium.
From equation (2), and given our distributional assumption, the average ability of entrants from














We will later describe alternative mechanisms, based on diﬀerences in outside options uL <
uH, through which the L-community network would have strengthened more rapidly than the H-






dt , ∀t. It follows
immediately, from equation (3), that the average entrant’s ability will decline more steeply in the
L-community over time, matching the entry patterns in Figure 1 and Table 4.
4.2 Alternative Explanations
The alternative explanations for the patterns in Figure 1 and Table 4 that we consider next do not
require networks to be active. They will be derived by allowing communities to diﬀer along other
dimensions, speciﬁcally by relaxing some of the assumptions that we made to get to equation (3).
One of these alternative explanations will be ruled out immediately using the results in Table 4. The
other explanations will be ruled out in the next section, using variation in ﬁrm performance across
communities and over time.
1. The ability distribution varies across cohorts and communities: Suppose we relax the
assumption that the ability distribution is ﬁxed and allow ability over successive cohorts to decline and
to diverge across communities. With our distributional assumption, this is conveniently implemented
19by allowing the right support of the ability distribution to decline across all cohorts, but more steeply
in the L-community. Then it is easy to verify from equation (3) that W
j
t will decline more steeply in
the L-community even when network eﬀects, measured by G
j
t−1, are absent.
As discussed, the fact that entrepreneurs establish their ﬁrms at diﬀerent ages allows us to control
for diﬀerential changes in population characteristics across communities. Recall from Table 4, Columns
4-6 that the Kathiawari-establishment year coeﬃcient grows larger in absolute magnitude when the
age terms are included, indicating that diﬀerences in family background and educational attainment
between the Kathiawaris and the more established communities may actually have been narrowing
over time. The age variables control for average changes in population characteristics across cohorts
and it is possible, at least in principle, for the right support of the ability distribution to diverge even as
average ability was converging across communities. Tests described below, based on ﬁrm performance
across communities and over time, will be used to rule out this unlikely possibility.
2. Outside options vary across communities and over time: Returning to equation (3),
suppose now that uj is declining over time, more steeply in the L-community. Once again, W
j
t will
decline more steeply in the L-community, without requiring networks to be active. This alternative
explanation is more diﬃcult to rule out because changes in outside options occur contemporaneously
with entry decisions.
One approach to rule out this alternative explanation, as well as the possibility that the age controls
do not fully account for diﬀerential changes in population characteristics, is to study ﬁrm performance
across communities and over time. With constant returns to scale in production, the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ
or proﬁt is a linear function of its exports. In our framework, the ﬁrm’s performance, measured by
its exports, can then be described by the expression: θ[Gt−1 + rIω
j
i], where θ is a positive constant
mapping proﬁts into exports. Firm-level export data over the 1994-2004 period were made available by
the GJEPC. If networks are absent and the relatively steep ability decline in the L-community is caused
by changing outside options or population characteristics, then exports should decline more steeply in
the L-community. More generally, once we allow for secular shifts in exports over time, the prediction
is that exports in the L-community should increasingly lag behind exports in the H-community. In
contrast, if an underlying network is supporting the entry of entrepreneurs with weaker backgrounds,
then a comparison of unconditional exports across communities yields ambiguous results.16 Once we
16It can be veriﬁed from equation (2), after some manipulation, that the marginal entrant’s exports will lag behind
over time in the L-community when networks are active. However, the comparison of entrepreneurs with average ability
in their community is not as straightforward.







that the export trajectory must certainly be steeper in the L-community when networks are active.
Under the alternative hypotheses, exports in the L-community and the H-community should, instead,
track together when ﬁxed eﬀects are included.
3. Ability is mis-measured: The model and the regressions in Table 4 assume that en-
trepreneurial ability is measured by family background alone. However, the intrinsic capability that
the entrepreneur is endowed with could also contribute to his success. Once we relax the assump-
tion that each ﬁrm consists of a single entrepreneur, the senior partner could also compensate for
any personal weakness by matching with capable partners or hiring well qualiﬁed employees. Finally,
entrepreneurs could compensate for their weak business backgrounds by preparing themselves prior to
establishing their ﬁrms. The survey collected information on the entrepreneur’s employment activity
prior to entering the diamond industry as well as his activities within the industry prior to entering
the current ﬁrm. In general, there is no evidence that the Kathiawaris make a special eﬀort to prepare
themselves prior to entry.17 Nevertheless, we leave open the possibility that entrepreneurs could com-
pensate for their weak personal backgrounds along other unobserved dimensions, diﬀerentially across
communities and over time, in which case the observed patterns in Figure 1 could be entirely spurious.
To demonstrate that eﬀective ability among the entering Kathiawari entrepreneurs did indeed
decline over time relative to their rivals, we once again take advantage of the fact that ﬁrm-level export
data are available over multiple years. If the pool of Kathiawari entrepreneurs is indeed worsening
over time, then the export trajectory for that community should grow steeper once ﬁxed eﬀects that
control for this compositional change are included. Moreover, if the ability decline is steeper for the
Kathiawaris than for the Marwaris and Palanpuris, then the impact of the ﬁxed eﬀects on the export
trajectory should be larger in that community.
4. Returns inside the industry vary across communities and over time: Since we are
concerned with cross-community variation in family background and ﬁrm exports, we could easily relax
the assumption that prices and the returns to ability in the diamond industry are constant. However,
17The activities prior to entry into the industry include: did nothing, farming, white-collar professional job, jewelry
business, colored stone or pearl business, and other business. Combining the last three categories, 6% of the Kathiawaris
versus 19% of the Marwaris and 9% of the Palanpuris reported that they were engaged in any type of business activity
before entering the industry. The list of activities within the industry but prior to entering the current ﬁrm included: did
nothing, cut and polished diamonds, worked as a manufacturing contractor, served as an employee/apprentice, worked
as a broker, was involved in rough or polished trading, and was a partner in another ﬁrm. Combining the last four
categories, 52% of the Kathiawaris versus 71% of the Marwaris and 65% of the Palanpuris reported prior activity that
would have prepared them directly for the diamond export business.
21if Kathiawaris occupy a particular niche in the diamond industry and returns in that niche have
grown disproportionately fast over time, then this could explain the weakening family background of
entering Kathiawaris without an accompanying decline in their relative performance, even if networks
are absent.
Kathiawari ﬁrms tend to specialize in small stones; these stones account for 57% of their output
by value, versus 44% and 49% for the Marwaris and the Palanpuris, respectively.18 Small stones
make up the most dynamic and competitive segment of the market and, if anything, we would expect
the availability of these stones (per ﬁrm) to have declined over time, relative to other sizes. We will
nevertheless include the proportion of small stones in the ﬁrm’s output interacted with time as an
additional variable in the export regression (the uninteracted proportion will also be included in the
speciﬁcation without ﬁxed eﬀects), with the expectation that this should only strengthen the results.
4.3 Firm Performance Across Communities and Over Time
Citing conﬁdentiality concerns, the GJEPC did not release ﬁrm-level export ﬁgures when it provided
its database to be used to design the survey in 2004. However, it reversed its decision in 2005 once
the survey had been completed and I had established more credibility in the industry. I was provided
with export data over the 1994-2004 period, which can be matched to the 95% of ﬁrms in the sample
that appear in the database. To mask ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁgures, the ﬁrms in the database were sorted by
export level and then divided into 100 groups in each year by the GJEPC. The average export level
in a group was then assigned to all ﬁrms in that group. While this procedure generates some noise in
the export data, it does not bias the estimated community coeﬃcients in the export regressions that
I describe below.
Table 5, Column 1 regresses exports on a time trend, the interaction of the time trend with
Kathiawari and Marwari dummies, and a full set of community dummies.19 We see that the coeﬃcient
on the Kathiawari-year interaction term is positive but insigniﬁcant; Kathiawari exports do not lag
behind Palanpuri exports despite the fact that entrepreneurs from this community with relatively
weak backgrounds were entering the industry over time. The community-year eﬀects in Column 1
18We classiﬁed stones into seven sizes in the survey: -2, stars, mele, +11, pointers, stones, and larger stones. Small
stones are deﬁned to include -2, stars, and mele.
19For ﬁrms with multiple names, we took care to discard the “shell ﬁrm,” which typically reports negligible exports in
each year. An additional complication when computing the export ﬁgures is that polished diamonds sold to merchant
exporters will not appear under the supplying ﬁrm’s name. Based on changes in the organization of ﬁrms that we report
below, this would increasingly underestimate export levels for the Kathiawaris over time and so provide a conservative
estimate of the role of their network in supporting entrepreneurship.
22reﬂect changes in the strength of the network as well as changes in the composition of ﬁrms over
time. Controlling for compositional change with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects in Column 2, the Kathiawari-year
interaction coeﬃcient increases in size and is now signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. The increase
in the steepness of the export trajectory from Column 1 to Column 2 is substantially larger for
the Kathiawaris than for the Marwaris or Palanpuris, indicating that the relatively steep decline in
the background of entering entrepreneurs from that community did indeed have consequences for
ﬁrm performance. As discussed above, the fact that the Kathiawaris do not lag behind in Column
1, together with their signiﬁcantly steeper trajectory in Column 2 with ﬁxed eﬀects, also rules out
diﬀerential changes in outside options or population characteristics as alternative explanations for our
results.
Another explanation for the selective entry, which is also consistent with changes in performance
across communities and over time, is based on rapidly improving conditions in the Kathiawari segment
of the industry. Table 5, Columns 3-4 include the proportion of rough stones in the ﬁrm’s output
interacted with time as an additional regressor (the uninteracted variable is also included in Column 3
without ﬁxed eﬀects). The coeﬃcient on this interaction term is negative and signiﬁcant (in Column
4), indicating that the small-stone segment has become relatively less proﬁtable over time, while the
Kathiawari-year coeﬃcient continues to be positive and signiﬁcant once ﬁxed eﬀects are included.
When a ﬁrm is involved in all stages of the production process, typically three partners, who are
invariably close relatives, are required; one to buy roughs, the second to supervise the cutting and
polishing, and the third to market the polished. In contrast, a merchant exporter could get by with no
additional partners. Many Marwari and Palanpuri ﬁrms have restricted their activities to merchant
exporting in recent years, often leading to the termination of existing partnerships. This explains, in
part, why over 17% of Marwari and Palanpuri ﬁrms were formed following a separation by partners,
as opposed to only 8% of the Kathiawari ﬁrms.20 When two relatives who were partners separate,
one individual will keep the original name while the other starts a new ﬁrm under a diﬀerent name.
Since rough suppliers and polished buyers will be divided among the partners, both ﬁrms will be
smaller than the original ﬁrm, at least to begin with. To rule out the possibility that the positive
Kathiawari-year coeﬃcient is a consequence of greater separation among Marwari and Palanpuri ﬁrms,
20The Kathiawari ﬁrms have signiﬁcantly more partners than ﬁrms from the other communities: The average number
of partners, with standard errors in parentheses, is 2.81(0.12), 2.07(0.12), 2.22(0.07) for the Kathiawaris, Marwaris, and
Palanpuris, respectively. Moreover, around 40% of the Marwari and Palanpuri ﬁrms are proprietary concerns versus 25%
of the Kathiawari ﬁrms.
23Table 5, Columns 5-6 exclude ﬁrms that have separated or were formed following a separation from
the sample. The Kathiawari-year coeﬃcient remains stable and continues to be precisely estimated
with this reduced sample of ﬁrms.21
Notice, in contrast with the positive Kathiawari-year coeﬃcient, that the coeﬃcient on the Marwari-
year term is negative across all speciﬁcations in Table 5, consistent with the view that superior outside
options in that community are associated with a weakening industry-speciﬁc network. The estimated
coeﬃcients in the ﬁxed eﬀects regressions indicate that the Kathiawari network increased average
sales for its members by approximately 240 thousand dollars per year over and above the Palanpuri
benchmark, which reﬂects growth in that network as well as secular changes in the industry, eﬀectively
compensating for their increasingly weak business backgrounds. To get a sense of the importance of
this diﬀerential network eﬀect, average annual sales for Kathiawari ﬁrms were roughly 4.7 million
dollars per year over the 1994-2004 period.22
5 Network Strengthening Mechanisms
In this section we consider two mechanisms through which networks could have strengthened over
time: (i) growth at the extensive margin through an increase in the number of ﬁrms, and (ii) growth
at the intensive margin through network-strengthening investments by members of the network. We
will see that the Kathiawari network should have grown stronger, under reasonable conditions, in each
case. However, only the latter mechanism turns out to be empirically relevant in this industry.
5.1 Growth at the Extensive Margin
As discussed, the set of entrepreneurs providing referrals varies from one period to the next depending
on the mix of stones received by suppliers in Antwerp. If a ﬁxed proportion of entrepreneurs in the
network provide referrals in each period and each entrepreneur provides a ﬁxed number of referrals
21Although we ruled out individual experience eﬀects when modelling entry decisions and ﬁrm performance, the cross-
community patterns in Table 5 could also be obtained if ﬁrms with weaker backgrounds, who are disproportionately
Kathiawari, beneﬁt more from their experience in the industry. It is well known that individual experience eﬀects and
time eﬀects (the network eﬀects in this context) cannot be separately identiﬁed with panel data once ﬁxed eﬀects are
included. However, if experience eﬀects were indeed substantially larger for entrepreneurs with weaker backgrounds,
then we would expect such entrepreneurs to enter the industry at a younger age. Instead, we see precisely the opposite
pattern (not reported), both in the full sample and within each community.
22Exports are measured in millions of 1994 Rupees in Table 5 and the exchange rate was 31 Rupees to the dollar in
that year. While the Kathiawaris grow at least as fast as the Marwaris and Palanpuris in Table 5, they do not lag behind
in the level of exports either. Average exports over the 1994-2004 period (in millions of dollars per year) are 3.8 for the
Marwaris and 5.0 for the Palanpuris.
24then it is evident that the probability of receiving a referral is independent of network size. However,
the amount of roughs received on credit with each referral will be positively correlated with network
size if larger networks can sustain higher levels of cooperation. Apart from the loss in network
services (referrals), an individual who has reneged on his obligations could also lose access to the
suppliers that his network is connected with and this loss would be increasing in network size under
the reasonable assumption that larger networks interact with more suppliers. A larger network might
also be better positioned to punish the deviator by adversely aﬀecting his reputation outside the
industry; for example, by reducing his marriage prospects in the wider community. With larger
sanctions, inside and outside the industry, higher levels of credit can be sustained without default,
increasing the level of production and hence the proﬁts of ﬁrms in larger networks.
As before, assume that the individual receives referrals from the cohort that preceded him. When
ability is uniformally distributed on the unit interval, the size of the network that is available to an
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To initiate the network dynamics, assume that all individuals with ability above ω0 are exogenously
moved into the industry, in both the H-community and the L-community, in period 0. Starting with
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25Noting that αj is increasing in uj, the threshold ability level declines over time in both communities,
with a steeper decline in the L-community. Based on our characterization of network strength, it
follows immediately that the L-network strengthens more rapidly than the H-network over time. In
addition, since W
j
t = (1 + ω
j
t)/2, it is easy to verify that the average entrant’s ability declines more
steeply over time in the L-community as well.23 These results are generated entirely by diﬀerences in
outside options between communities; uL < uH.
Variation in network size across communities and over time can, in principle, explain the observed
patterns in Table 4 and Table 5. The question is whether growth at the extensive margin is empirically
relevant in this industry. To address this question, Figure 2 plots the number of ﬁrms by community
over the 1965-2004 period, based on the establishment year of the ﬁrms in the sample. The Palanpuris
are always the dominant group, growing at a fairly constant rate over the entire 40-year period. The
Marwaris and the Kathiawaris track together at a slower rate up till the early 1980s, but while the
Marwaris continue to grow at that rate, the Kathiawaris grow as fast as the Palanpuris thereafter.
Contrary to the popular perception in the industry that the Kathiawaris suddenly entered business in
the late 1970s, we see that a few Kathiawari ﬁrms were active as far back as the 1960s. Nevertheless,
there is a trend-break in the early 1980s, which is just after the time that the ﬁrst supply shocks
hit the industry. If we were to divide the 1965-2004 period into two equal halves, the Kathiawaris
would actually grow signiﬁcantly faster than the Palanpuris in the latter period (not reported). The
relatively small diﬀerence in these trajectories, however, does not seem suﬃcient to explain the rapidly
expanding gap in the ability of entering ﬁrms across communities and over time described in Table 4
and Figure 1.
Why didn’t the number of Kathiawari ﬁrms grow faster over time? Communities are distinguished
by their outside options alone in our framework, whereas we would expect the underlying ability
distribution in the Kathiawari population to be dominated by the corresponding distributions among
the Marwaris and Palanpuris as well. In our framework, diﬀerences in ability across communities can
be conveniently generated by allowing the right support of the distribution to vary. Let this support
be denoted by Sj, with SL < SH. From equation (4), αj ≡
uj−gSj
rI−rO , making clear the opposing eﬀects
of outside options and ability. We could control for diﬀerences in underlying ability in Table 4 to
23A previous version of the paper showed that this result would be obtained as long as the technology mapping network
size to individual proﬁts was not too concave and the density was non-decreasing moving down the ability distribution.
These conditions ensured that the L-network would grow more rapidly at each point in time, even when it had far
outstripped the H-network in size.
26isolate the eﬀect of the network on selection into the industry. However, when measuring changes
in network strength, it is the unconditional growth in the number of ﬁrms that matters, and in this
industry these opposing forces appear on net to have generated little additional entry and, hence, little
extra growth in network size for the Kathiawaris.
5.2 Growth at the Intensive Margin
Up to this point we have assumed that all entrepreneurs beneﬁt from the community network and
contribute to it. The implicit condition underlying this assumption is that the threat of punishment
by members of the network is suﬃcient to deter deviations from cooperative behavior. In practice,
we might expect individuals to make investments in the industry-speciﬁc network that increase the
level of cooperation that can be sustained in equilibrium. One example of such an investment is
marriage within the industry. The basic marriage rule in Hindu society is that no individual can
match outside the sub-caste or jati. The dense web of marriage ties that consequently forms over
the course of many generations improves information ﬂows and reduces commitment problems, and
not surprisingly networks serving diﬀerent functions have historically been organized, and continue
to be organized, at the level of the jati. Among business communities, marriage alliances within
speciﬁc industries are, in addition, commonly observed (Hazlehurst 1966). Such marriages strengthen
industry-speciﬁc community networks when monitoring and enforcement at the wider jati level is
imperfect, and in our sample, 35% of the entrepreneurs and 57% of their children married within the
diamond industry.
In our simple framework, the individual chooses whether or not to enter the industry at a ﬁxed
age, at which time he makes his marriage decision as well. Individuals receive referrals from the cohort
that preceded them. Although individuals can choose the level of participation in the network that is
optimal for them in practice, we assume that only those individuals who marry within the industry
contribute to the network and beneﬁt from it. We will see that there exists an ability threshold
above which individuals enter the diamond industry, as before. In addition, there will exist an ability
threshold above which individuals select out of the network, conditional on having entered the industry.




















i equals one if individual i from community j who has chosen to enter the industry also invests
27in the network, X
j
i equals zero if he does not. ω
j
t−1 is the ability threshold above which individuals
entered the industry in the preceding cohort and ω
j
t−1 is the threshold above which they selected out
of the network. Assuming that ability is uniformally distributed on the unit interval, the measure of






t−1. The linear mapping from this
measure to individual payoﬀs is characterized by the h term, which is presumably larger than the g
parameter deﬁned earlier. Finally, the return to individual ability (conditional on having entered the
industry) is assumed to greater outside than inside the network; ∆rI measures this gap in returns.
The motivation for this assumption, as in Munshi and Rosenzweig (2005, 2006), is that networks, and
collective institutions more generally, equalize returns for their members, whereas the performance of
independent entrepreneurs is much more responsive to ability. This implies that relatively high ability
entrepreneurs will select out of the network in each community.
Using the preceding expression for payoﬀs inside the diamond industry, individual i in community






Using the same expression for payoﬀs outside the industry as in equation (2) and noting that the
marginal individual who enters the industry also invests in the network, individual i in community j
will enter the industry (and invest in the network) if:
h∆ω
j
t−1 + (rI − ∆rI)ω
j
i ≥ uj + rOω
j
i.
Based on the entry conditions derived above, the thresholds for selection out of the network and
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out of the network. Subtracting the expression for ω
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Assume that a measure ∆ω0 of ﬁrms exogenously invest in the network in both communities
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Imposing parametric restrictions, ∆ω0 − ˜ αj
˜ β−1 > 0, ˜ β > 1 that ensure that ∆ω
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t > 0, the change
in network strength – the measure of ﬁrms that invest in the network – across communities and over
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The measure of ﬁrms that invest in the network grows over time. This growth is steeper in the
L-community, which implies that the gap in network strength across communities should widen over
time, as observed in Table 5.24 These diﬀerential changes in network strength have implications for
the average ability of entrants into the industry across communities and over time. In this simple




t)/2. Substituting from equation (8) in equation
(7), it is easy to verify that the average entrant’s ability will decline over time, more steeply in the
L-community, matching the patterns in Table 4.
By allowing ﬁrms to select into or out of the network, conditional on having entered the industry, we
can also characterize the relationship between the evolution of networks and the organization of ﬁrms in
the market. Most ﬁrms periodically make short trips to Antwerp and so must rely on their networks
for much of their rough supply. Other ﬁrms have vertically integrated by establishing branches in
Antwerp. This permanent presence in the Antwerp market allows them to source roughs directly,
without relying on their networks. The ability of the network to punish these ﬁrms is consequently
24˜ β > 1 implies that rI − rO − ∆rI > 0. It then follows that u
j and ˜ α
j have the same sign. Because ˜ β > 1, these
comparative statics and the results derived below only apply to periods before the time that the entire entering cohort
in the L-community invests in the network.
29limited and they would have restricted access to the network in any case. Finally, merchant exporters
restrict their activity to buying and selling polished diamonds and so would have little use for the
network’s services. Placing vertically integrated ﬁrms and merchant exporters outside the network, we
can derive changes in the organization of ﬁrms across communities and over time by studying changes
in ω
j










t/dt > 0 implies that the measure of non-network ﬁrms is increasing, but at a
declining rate over time. The marginal decline is smaller in the H-community since d2ω
j
t/d˜ αjdt < 0.
These results indicate that non-network ﬁrms are more likely to be drawn from the H-community and
that the community-gap should be widening over time.25 In our framework, ﬁrms belonging to the H-
community are more likely to select out of the network for two reasons: First, they have higher ability
on average than ﬁrms from the L-community and this ability gap is widening over time. Second, their
network is weakening relative to the L-community network over time and so they have less to lose by
selecting out of it.
Figure 3 plots the growth in the number of merchant exporters across communities and over time.
These ﬁrms emerged in the mid-1970s, allowing the Kathiawaris, without contacts on the polished
side of the market, to later enter the export business. As predicted, the merchant exporters are drawn
predominantly from the Marwari and Palanpuri communities and it is apparent from the ﬁgure that the
gap between the number of merchant exporters belonging to these established business communities
and the Kathiawari community has grown over time. I deﬁne a merchant exporter to be a ﬁrm that
has only been active on the polished side of the market, both when it started exporting and currently.
A number of Palanpuris who were previously involved in all stages of the import-export process have
recently reduced their activities to merchant exporting. If we accounted for the shift of such ﬁrms into
merchant exporting in Figure 3, then the gap between the Kathiawaris and the other communities
would widen even further over time.
A ﬁrm is deﬁned to be vertically integrated when it establishes a branch in Antwerp and we see
in Figure 4 that the number of vertically integrated Palanpuri ﬁrms increases dramatically from the
late 1970s onwards. There is a ﬁxed cost to setting up a branch abroad – apart from the monetary
25This result does not follow mechanically because the measure of H-community ﬁrms in the industry is increasing









jdt > 0. The measure of new ﬁrms entering the industry in each cohort is given
by (1−ω
j
t) and so these results imply that the total number of new ﬁrms entering the industry will be increasing at the
margin, more rapidly in the L-community.
30expense, a close relative must also typically reside there – and so the ﬁrm will weigh the returns from
procuring roughs through the community network with the returns from this substantial investment
when choosing between these options. The returns to vertical integration will depend to a large extent
on how easy it is for the ﬁrm to access roughs on its own, once it is established in Antwerp. The
exogenous increase in the world supply of rough diamonds, described earlier, presumably provided the
impetus for Palanpuri ﬁrms to set up branches in Antwerp. And, as discussed, these ﬁrms played an
important role in the subsequent growth of the Kathiawari network. Notice that the timing of the
increase in vertical integration among the Palanpuris in Figure 4 matches perfectly with the onset of
the ability decline among entering Kathiawari entrepreneurs in Figure 1.
While the gap in the number of vertically integrated Kathiawari and Palanpuri ﬁrms widens over
time, as predicted, notice from Figure 4 that very few Marwari ﬁrms vertically integrate. Marwari
business activities are well diversiﬁed across space and industries. Fixed investments in the industry,
such as setting up a branch in Antwerp, are consequently particularly costly for the Marwaris and this
might explain why they concentrate on the polished side of the market.26
The number of Marwari and Palanpuri ﬁrms operating outside the network increased relatively
rapidly over time in Figures 3-4, despite the fact that the total number of Kathiawari ﬁrms kept
pace with the number of Palanpuri ﬁrms, and outstripped the Marwari ﬁrms, in Figure 2. These
diﬀerential trajectories are consistent with the theoretical framework developed above. What remains
is to verify that our measure of network strengthening investment, intra-industry marriage, increased
more rapidly across entering cohorts in the L-community.
The dependent variable in Table 6, Column 1 takes the value one if the spouse’s family was
in the diamond industry prior to their marriage, zero otherwise. The regressors include the ﬁrm’s
establishment year, a full set of community dummies, and the interaction of the establishment year with
the community dummies. The establishment year coeﬃcient is negative but insigniﬁcant. Although
the model predicts that intra-industry marriage should be increasing over time for all communities,
this coeﬃcient cannot be interpreted once we allow for secular changes inside or outside the industry.
More importantly, the Kathiawari - establishment year coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant, in line
26Although the theoretical framework provides one explanation for why the Kathiawaris may be less likely to vertically
integrate, an alternative explanation is that their rural, less Westernized background makes it diﬃcult for them to live
abroad. However, the Kathiawaris are nearly as likely as the Marwaris and Palanpuris to set up branches in the United
States, Asia and Europe to market polished diamonds, and the increase in the number of these branches among the
Kathiawaris matches the corresponding increase for the Palanpuris during the 1990s. Recall that networks are less
important and that ﬁrms eﬀectively operate independently on the polished side of the market.
31with the network strengthening mechanism that has been proposed.27
Intra-industry marriage will mechanically respond to growth in the number of ﬁrms in the industry,
which expands the pool of prospective partners from within the industry and the community. We saw
in Figure 2 that the number of Kathiawari ﬁrms did not grow especially fast, at least relative to the
Palanpuris. Nevertheless, we include the number of ﬁrms from the entrepreneur’s own community
that were already active when his ﬁrm was established, and the squared value of this variable, as
additional regressors in Table 6, Column 2. Not surprisingly, the results reported in Column 1 are
unchanged, with the Kathiawari-establishment year coeﬃcient, in particular, continuing to be positive
and signiﬁcant.
Apart from his own marriage decision, the entrepreneur could also invest in the network through
the marriage choices he makes for his children. Although the Kathiawari children continue to lag
behind the established communities in educational attainment and the likelihood of being schooled in
English, the community-gap has narrowed substantially across the generations (not reported). The
sons of the respondents who have completed school are almost without exception absorbed into the
diamond industry, whereas almost none of the daughters work outside the home. The corresponding
statistics for the spouses of the (married) children broadly match these occupational patterns, except
that a signiﬁcant proportion of the daughters marry white-collar professionals or businessmen in other
industries. One-third of the Marwari daughters are married to businessmen operating outside the
diamond industry, consistent with the idea that many outside opportunities are available for members
of that community. Along the same lines, just 16% of the daughter-in-laws and 37% of the son-in-laws
of the Marwari respondents come from families that were already in the diamond business prior to
marriage. These numbers are signiﬁcantly lower than the corresponding statistics for the Kathiawaris
and Palanpuris. However, 90% of the children from all three communities continue to marry within
their jatis, highlighting their continued ties to the broader community networks.
Table 6, Column 3 repeats the regression that we ran for the entrepreneur in Column 1, with
27Marriage within the community or sub-caste would seem to be a pre-condition for marriage within the industry, based
on our characterization of the industry-speciﬁc community network. As expected, while 92% of the entrepreneurs in the
sample married within their community, the corresponding statistic for entrepreneurs who married within the industry is
as high as 98%. Although caste networks have been historically very stable, recent evidence from urban India indicates
that some of these traditional networks may be starting to decay, with an accompanying decline in intra-community
marriage (Munshi and Rosenzweig 2006). An alternative explanation for the cross-community variation in Table 6,
Column 1 would then be that intra-community marriage has declined more rapidly over time among the urbanized and
Westernized Marwaris and Palanpuris. However, regressions (not reported) with our sample of entrepreneurs indicate that
intra-community marriage actually increased over time among the Palanpuris (the reference category), while remaining
roughly constant for the other two communities.
32intra-industry marriage for the children as the dependent variable. The child’s gender is now included
as an additional regressor but the speciﬁcation from Column 1 is otherwise unchanged. Once again,
the Kathiawari-establishment year coeﬃcient is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. Table 6, Column
4 includes the number of ﬁrms from the entrepreneur’s community that were already active in the
industry when his ﬁrm was established (linear and quadratic terms) as additional regressors, without
changing any of the results once again.
To provide a sense of the economic importance of these cross-community diﬀerences in marriage
patterns, Figure 5 presents nonparametric estimates of the relationship between the entrepreneur’s
marriage choice and the ﬁrm’s establishment year, corresponding to the speciﬁcation in Column 1.
The nonparametric estimates for the Marwaris and Palanpuris are noisy in the tails (pre-1975 and
post-2000), but no time trend is discernable in either community, consistent with the estimates in
Table 6, Column 1. Sample averages indicate that 16% of the Marwaris and 45% of the Palanpuris
married within the industry. The corresponding statistic for the Kathiawaris is 28%, but as in Table 6,
Column 1 notice the substantial increase in such network strengthening marriages over time, starting
just above zero in 1970 and reaching 45% by 2004. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2005, 2006) describe
how individuals at the top of the ability or wealth distribution in their sub-caste start to exit, with
an accompanying increase in out-marriage, as their traditional networks start to decay. In this paper
we observe the opposite pattern, with a decline in the marginal entrant’s ability and an increase in
intra-industry marriage as the new Kathiawari business network develops.
Previously we attributed the relatively slow increase in the number of Kathiawari ﬁrms, despite
their poor outside options, to the eﬀect of a weaker ability distribution in that community. When it
comes to growth at the intensive margin, however, the eﬀect of weaker ability is no longer unambigu-
ously negative. Lower ability will continue to dampen entry into the industry, mechanically reducing
the size of the network. But lower ability individuals are also more likely to invest in the network,
conditional on having entered the industry. The net eﬀect of worse outside options and lower ability
in this industry appears to have been to strengthen the Kathiawari network, relative to its rivals, at
the intensive margin.
The preceding argument relies, in part, on the assumption that ﬁrms with relatively low ability in
their entering cohort are more likely to invest in the network. We complete the analysis by verifying
this assumption. Let non-network ﬁrms include merchant exporters and vertically integrated ﬁrms
and let network ﬁrms include all other exporters. Including the ﬁrm’s establishment year, a full set of
33community dummies, and the interaction of the establishment year with these dummies, as controls
we see in Table 7, Columns 1-3 that network ﬁrms have lower observed ability as assumed, although
the network coeﬃcient is only signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. Further, entrepreneurs and their
children from network ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly more likely to marry within the industry in Columns 4-5,
consistent with the equilibrium correlation between network membership and marriage implied by the
model.
6 Conclusion
This paper documents the role played by a new business network in supporting occupational mobility in
an industry with substantial barriers to entry. Based on the preceding analysis, there are three reasons
why such mobility could fail to be observed in other industries: First, if the tradeoﬀ between ability
and outside options is less favorable than it was in the diamond industry, then new networks might fail
to grow, even at the intensive margin, dampening entry by new entrepreneurs. Second, although we
do not model network dynamics in this fashion, it is possible that there exists a minimum scale below
which networks cannot function. In the diamond industry, a supply shock fortuitously generated
simultaneous entry by a number of new entrepreneurs. Non-convexities in the network technology
could, however, serve as a barrier to entry in other industries. Third, in industries where networks
are absent, there is no force that will emerge endogenously to compensate potential entrepreneurs for
their weak family backgrounds.
The provision of (subsidized) bank credit will promote new entrepreneurship in each of the scenarios
described above. In the second scenario, a temporary infusion of credit is suﬃcient to set the new
network on a positive growth trajectory. In the other scenarios, however, disadvantaged individuals
or groups would need to be supported for much longer periods of time – as long as a generation in the
framework of our model – with ambiguous eﬃciency and welfare consequences. In an industry such
as the diamond industry where the network and supplier credit have eﬀectively substituted for bank
credit, the infusion of this new source of capital could actually have substantial negative consequences,
as discussed below.
Diamond ﬁrms have few ﬁxed assets and banks must use their rough inventory as security when
providing them with credit. The value of rough diamonds is uncertain and easily manipulated, and
so it is no surprise that banks have historically kept away from this industry. However, this policy
34has changed dramatically with ﬁnancial liberalization in India. Ten years ago, three banks provided
credit to the industry. Today, nearly 60 banks provide credit (Solitaire International, January 2007)
and the current outstandings, based on Reserve Bank of India statistics, are estimated to be close to
four billion dollars.
This surge in bank credit allowed ﬁrms to compete vigorously for roughs in Antwerp, pushing
up the price and encouraging DeBeers and other primary suppliers to unload their rough stocks on
the market from 2000 onwards. The increase in the polished diamond supply that followed quickly
outstripped the demand and as noted in Section 3 the delay in payment on the polished side of the
market had lengthened substantially by 2004-05. This delay made it diﬃcult for ﬁrms to repay their
rough suppliers in a timely fashion and starting from 2005, the rough suppliers in Antwerp cut back
drastically on their credit to diamond ﬁrms. Without supplier credit, which continues to be the
main source of capital in the industry, the rough diamonds cannot move and the industry is now in
a downturn. The past few months have witnessed the unprecedented phenomenon of sightholders
refusing to accept their boxes of roughs, which were once a prized commodity, from the DTC and
industry observers predict that the downturn in the industry is unlikely to be rectiﬁed in the immediate
future (IDEXmagazine, Issue no. 198, October 10, 2006).28
There are two reasons why the rough suppliers might have cut back on credit. First, the availability
of bank credit without suﬃcient monitoring allowed ﬁrms to buy roughs recklessly, pushing up the
price and increasing delays in payment and default rates. Second, ﬁrms that now had access to bank
credit had less to lose by reneging on their obligations to the network, providing another channel
through which defaults would have increased. Networks that took many decades to mature have now
been undermined and it is not clear that they will be in a position to provide their former levels of
support when the industry corrects itself and recovers from the current downturn. The banks could,
in principle, have exploited the monitoring and enforcement capability of the networks to judiciously
increase the supply of capital and stimulate entry, as well as growth in the industry. Instead, the
indiscriminate provision of bank credit may have undermined an institution based on trust that took
many decades to develop, leaving the industry less stable in the future.
28Reserve Bank of India statistics indicate that the ratio of bank credit outstanding to imports in the Gem and Jewelry
sector was just under 0.25 from 1997 to 2004, then increased unexpectedly to 0.37 in 2005 and to 0.41 in 2006. Rough
diamonds account for approximately 90% of Gem and Jewelry imports, by value, and so these changes in the credit-
import ratio are almost certainly associated with the downturn in the diamond industry and the associated decline in
supplier credit. The banks are currently dangerously over-exposed in this industry and recent statements by bankers
indicate that they are now aware of the problem (Solitaire International, January 2007).
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38Table 1: Referral Pattern
Source of referrals:
number of individuals 
that provided referrals
total number of 
referrals provided
percent of referrals 
for Kathiawaris
percent of referrals 
for Marwaris
percent of referrals 
for Palanpuris
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Kathiawari exporters 60 212 74.06 2.83 20.28
Marwari exporters 24 206 12.62 42.72 37.86
Palanpuri exporters 128 707 9.19 9.05 78.64
Brokers 47 239 31.38 14.23 51.05
Other 36 109 18.35 21.10 49.54
Note: Other sources of referrals include personal connections of the survey team and firms belonging to other communities.
A total of 295 individuals provided referrals in Column 1.
These individuals provided a total of 1,473 referrals in Column 2.
Columns 3-5 sum to approximately 95% because some referrals are also made to exporters from other communities.Table 2: Organization of Production
Community: Kathiawari Marwari Palanpuri
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Rough transactions
Number of suppliers per year 9.98 11.68 10.76
(1.17) (2.71) (1.13)
Percent of firms with a single dominant supplier 70.78 70.83 71.48
(3.68) (6.63) (2.83)
Percent of roughs sourced directly from Antwerp 76.31 63.18 67.98
(2.37) (4.99) (2.15)
Percent of roughs received on credit 80.78 73.48 75.39
(2.27) (4.99) (2.03)
Average repayment period (days) 102.39 98.29 101.44
(1.88) (4.78) (1.79)
Percent of transactions involving a written agreement 3.95 9.76 6.28
(1.58) (4.69) (1.57)
Panel B: Polished transactions
Number of buyers per year 33.23 49.57 30.11
(4.39) (14.11) (2.40)
Percent of firms with a single dominant buyer 52.91 69.03 58.65
(3.49) (4.37) (2.56)
Percent of polished sold directly to buyers abroad 59.10 69.42 63.35
(2.71) (3.42) (1.89)
Percent of polished sold on credit 77.20 82.95 84.37
(1.95) (2.38) (1.25)
Average repayment period (days) 102.11 114.24 113.49
(2.55) (3.89) (1.83)
Percent of transactions involving a written agreement 2.99 5.98 5.57
(1.20) (2.20) (1.18)
Note: standard errors in parentheses.
Dominant supplier is defined as a supplier who provides more than 30% of the firm's roughs.
Dominant buyer is defined as a buyer who accounts for more than 20% of the firm's polished.
Merchant exporters, who restrict their activity to the polished side of the market, are excluded from Panel A.Table 3: Characteristics of Entrepreneurs
Community: Kathiawari Marwari Palanpuri
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Individual characteristics
Age 42.46 46.13 49.05
(0.77) (0.92) (0.52)
Years of schooling 10.84 14.41 12.87
(0.26) (0.19) (0.12)
Percent schooled in English 11.47 47.20 37.28
(2.16) (4.48) (2.41)
Percent that grew up in Mumbai 22.02 26.40 49.38
(2.81) (3.96) (2.49)
Panel B: Family background
Father's occupation (%)
Farming 53.02 2.46 2.54
White-collar professional 5.58 13.93 15.52
Other business/store-owner/sales 11.16 27.05 27.23
Other jewelry business 5.12 29.51 11.96
Diamond cutting & polishing 7.44 1.64 6.62
Diamond broker/trader 2.79 3.28 9.92
Diamond exporter 14.88 22.13 26.21
Any business 34.56 82.40 75.81
(3.24) (3.42) (2.14)
Number of firms 218 125 405
Note: standard errors in parentheses. 
Any business includes other business/store-owner/sales, other jewelry business, diamond broker/trader, and diamond exporter.Table 4: Selection into the Industry 
Dependent variable: father not farmer father business schooling father not farmer father business schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Establishment year -0.001 -0.002 -0.022 -0.001 -0.002 -0.030
(0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.007)
Establishment year - Kathiawari -0.008 -0.011 -0.017 -0.016 -0.016 -0.065
(0.004) (0.004) (0.024) (0.004) (0.004) (0.025)
Establishment year - Marwari -0.00004 -0.003 0.025 0.0001 -0.003 0.031
(0.001) (0.002) (0.017) (0.001) (0.003) (0.018)
Age terms No No No Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 737 737 737 737 737 737
Note: Standard errors in parentheses clustered by establishment year.
All regressions include community dummies.
Entrepreneur's age is included, uninteracted and interacted with Kathiawari and Marwari dummies, in Columns 4-6.
Business occupations include other business/store-owner/sales, other jewelry business, diamond broker/trader, and diamond exporter.
Schooling is measured as years of educational attainment.Table 5: Firm Performance 
Dependent variable:
Sample:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year 12.940 14.272 17.593 20.585 14.114 15.293
(2.093) (1.906) (4.440) (3.287) (2.241) (1.954)
Year-Kathiawari 1.874 7.419 2.744 8.266 3.453 8.892
(3.938) (2.223) (3.803) (2.362) (4.054) (2.411)
Year-Marwari -7.514 -6.626 -8.214 -7.583 -7.113 -6.504
(2.332) (2.153) (2.520) (2.408) (2.553) (2.298)
Year-proportion small stones -- -- -0.100 -0.123 -- --
(0.056) (0.031)
Firm fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of observations 6,114 6,114 5,965 5,965 5,233 5,233
Note: Standard errors in parentheses clustered by year.
Exports are measured in millions of 1994 Rupees.
Proportion small stones measures the proportion of the firm's output that is accounted for by -2, stars, and mele.
Separated firms are formed following a split among original partners.
All regressions without firm fixed effects include community dummies.
exports
excluding separated firms all firmsTable 6: Marriage Choices 
Dependent variable:
Generation:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Establishment year -0.001 0.007 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
Establishment year - Kathiawari 0.009 0.011 0.014 0.017
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Establishment year - Marwari 0.003 -0.0002 0.008 0.009
(0.003) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008)
Number of active firms in the community No Yes No Yes
Number of observations 742 742 588 588
Note: Standard errors in parentheses clustered by establishment year.
All regressions include community dummies. Columns 3-4 also include a gender dummy.
Number of active firms in the community is computed in the year that the firm was established (linear and quadratic terms are included as regressors).
children
married within the industry
firm ownersTable 7: Selection into the Network 
Dependent variable:
father not farmer father business schooling entrepreneur children
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Network firm -0.031 -0.062 -0.396 0.079 0.081
(0.024) (0.037) (0.234) (0.032) (0.045)
Number of observations 737 737 737 742 588
Note: Standard errors in parentheses clustered by establishment year.
All regressions include community dummies and establishment year, uninteracted and interacted with Kathiawari and Marwari dummies.
Column 5 also includes a gender dummy.
Network firms exclude merchant exporters and vertically integrated firms.
married within the industry entrepreneur's characteristics